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1193 
What Does It Mean to Invent Nature? 
Brad Sherman* 
In recent years, there has been a proliferation in the number of superior 
court decisions concerned with patentable subject matter. Despite this, there 
is still a great deal of confusion about the types of things that are eligible for 
patent protection. Building on the idea that the subject-matter inquiry in 
patent law is effectively a taxonomic process of classification, this Article 
explores the different techniques that have been used to categorize patentable 
subject matter. Focusing on recent litigation in the United States and 
Australia involving Myriad Genetics’ patents for the BRCA1 and 
BRCA2 genes, this Article argues that while some of the uncertainty that 
accompanies the subject-matter inquiry is inevitable, many of the problems 
associated with subject matter eligibility arise because there is no real clarity 
about the criteria to be used when categorizing subject matter in patent law. 
Thus, it will be argued that patent law in the United States and Australia 
is ill equipped for the task of determining subject matter eligibility, at least 
in a way that does not seem to be arbitrary and capricious. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Over the last few years, there has been a lot written about Myriad Genetics’ 
controversial patents that grew out of the discovery of the human BRCA1 and 
BRCA2 genes and the fact that there was a close relationship between mutations in 
those genes and the development of breast and ovarian cancer. Given the subject 
matter of these patents1 and the way that they were implemented, it is not surprising 
that the patents were met with considerable resistance. It was also not surprising 
that the patents were challenged in a number of courts around the world. In this 
Article I wish to focus on two legs of that global litigation—namely, the decisions 
in the United States that culminated in the 2013 U.S. Supreme Court decision of 
Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.2 and the ongoing litigation in 
Australia: the latest instalment being the unanimous 2014 decision by the Full 
Federal Court in D’Arcy v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.3 
While the secondary literature devoted to Myriad’s patents covers a range of 
topics from a variety of different perspectives, it is united by the fact that most of 
the commentary has been very partisan in nature: it has either been written in 
support of, or against, Myriad’s patents and/or the relevant decision pronouncing 
on the fate of those patents. While there are some notable exceptions, most of the 
literature reads as if it was written as either an amicus curiae brief or a policy 
submission to some fictitious inquiry. On the one side, supporters of the patents 
have highlighted the important role that patents play in stimulating investment, 
while downplaying the negative consequences of such protection. In commenting 
on the U.S. Supreme Court decision, supporters of the patents also raised concerns 
about the chilling impact the decision might have on research in molecular 
diagnostics and in cognizant fields of study. On the other hand, critics of the patents 
have been united in their concern about the negative impact of the patents, 
particularly upon women’s health. As with many other biological innovations, there 
is also a sensitivity about the commodification of nature, which is exacerbated by 
the gravity of the illness, the business model used to exploit the invention, and the 
way this was perceived outside of the United States as a Trojan horse that was being 
used to undermine national approaches to health care. 
While the relative merit of Myriad’s patents is an important issue, in this Article 
I wish to change tact to focus on a separate issue which has linked both sides of the 
debate, namely, the criticisms that have been made about the reasoning of the courts 
 
 1. A number of different types of subject matter were at issue in the litigation including raw 
genomic or native DNA (gDNA), isolated DNA, synthetic DNA created in a laboratory from mRNA 
(complementary DNA or cDNA), and related methods claims. 
2. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2111 (2013) 
(holding that while raw DNA and isolated gene sequences were not patent eligible, synthetic cDNA 
sequences were). 
3. See D’Arcy v Myriad Genetics, Inc [2014] FCAFC 115, ¶ 218 (Austl.) (finding that the isolated 
DNA and the synthetic DNA were both patent eligible and upholding the single Federal Court decision 
in Cancer Voices Austl. v Myriad Genetics, Inc [2013] FCA 65, ¶ 136 (Austl.)). An application for leave to 
appeal to the High Court is pending. 
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when attempting to pass judgement over the patents. The feelings of many 
commentators are captured in the remark that the Supreme Court decision in Myriad 
will “only serve to increase the ambiguity and uncertainty plaguing the U.S. patent 
system.”4 They are also reflected in the comment that while the decision is useful 
insofar as it confirms that there is a distinct product-of-nature doctrine in the 
United States, “it leaves the substance of that doctrine, as well as its boundaries and 
application more uncertain than ever.”5 Criticisms of this ilk have been repeated 
again and again in the commentary on the decisions, which have consistently been 
described as uncertain, confused, puzzling, and contradictory. These criticisms 
about the reasoning in the Myriad litigation form part of a wider chorus of 
complaints that have accompanied other recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions 
where patentable subject matter was at issue. 
The aim of this Article is to stand back from the debates about the relative 
merits of Myriad’s patents to consider why it is that subject matter has created so 
many problems in both the United States and Australia. In a sense, the question that 
underpins this Article is: Why is it that patent law has experienced so many problems 
in dealing with the type of invention that is at stake in the Myriad litigation? In effect, 
it asks: What is at stake in asking the question, “what does it mean to invent nature?” 
This is not intended as an apology for the decisions, nor as a commentary on the 
patents at issue in those decisions. Instead, this Article attempts to situate the 
American and Australian litigation as part of a broader discussion about subject 
matter jurisprudence and the challenges currently facing patent law in both 
jurisdictions. Placing the Myriad decision in a broader context will not only help us 
to identify some of the problems with the subject-matter inquiry, it will also provide 
us with some possible ways of responding to these problems. 
Before attempting to answer these questions, it is important to note that the 
problems that have arisen in the Myriad litigation are neither endemic to genetic 
materials specifically nor to biological innovations more generally. Rather, as I will 
argue, the problems are a consequence of the way subject matter is addressed in 
American and Australian patent law. While with plant patents and plant variety 
rights protection there might inevitably be issues at the boundaries, for the most 
part the question of what qualifies as eligible subject matter in those contexts is 
relatively straightforward: questions of subject matter simply do not arise. The 
situation is similar in European patent law. Although questions about the scope and 
nature of biological inventions do arise—something that I will return to later—for 
the most part, European patent law is not concerned, at least in relation to biological 
innovations, with preliminary questions about the types of things that are to count 
 
4. Christopher M. Holman, Editorial: In Myriad the Supreme Court Has, Once Again, Increased the 
Uncertainty of U.S. Patent Law, 32 BIOTECHNOLOGY L. REP. 289 (2013). This is particularly true in 
relation to the “patent eligibility status of a synthetic molecule that shares a common, or highly similar, 
structure with a naturally occurring biomolecule.” Id. 
5. Dan L. Burk, Editorial, Are Human Genes Patentable?, 44 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & 
COMPETITION L. 747, 749 (2013). 
Sherman_production read v2 (clean) (Do Not Delete) 3/3/2016  7:10 PM 
1196 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5:1193 
as appropriate subject matter. The reason for this is that, as with plant patents and 
plant variety rights protection, decisions about the types of things that should be 
protected have already been decided in advance.6 The situation is markedly different 
however with (utility) patents in the United States and Australia where the question 
of whether it is possible to patent biological inventions is largely left to the judiciary 
and the patent offices to decide. 
It is also important to note that the problems associated with subject matter 
that have proliferated in recent years are a consequence of recent attempts by the 
courts to impose more stringent limits on patentable subject matter. Over the last 
few years, subject matter has become a key issue both in the United States and, to a 
lesser extent, in Australia. While questions occasionally arose prior to this, subject 
matter did not generate anywhere near the same types of problems that we have 
witnessed recently. In one sense, the reason for this change is straightforward: when 
the courts adopt a liberal approach to patentable subject matter, in a world where 
“anything under the sun that is made by man” is potentially patentable,7 there is no 
need to determine where and how the limits are to be set. In the world prior to 
Myriad, Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, Mayo Collaborative Services v. Promethus Labs, Inc., 
and Bilski v. Kappos, questions about where and how limits are to be drawn did not 
arise, or at least not as frequently as they have recently. The situation changed, 
however, when the courts attempted to impose some sort of (meaningful) limitation 
on the types of subject matter that can be patented. As a result, the courts found 
themselves in the position whereby they had to be able to explain why certain things 
were excluded, while others were included. It is the inability of patent law to respond 
to these demands that is at the heart of many of the complaints that have recently 
been made about patent jurisprudence. 
I. THE LEGAL ORDER OF THINGS 
The last five or so years have seen a dramatic increase in the number of 
decisions both in the United States and Australia, particularly superior court 
decisions, concerned with patentable subject matter. While there are important 
variations, these decisions have typically followed an almost formulaic approach 
that begins, unsurprisingly, with the relevant legislative considerations.8 Thus in the 
United States, judgments usually begin by reciting the language of § 101 that 
 
6. This was primarily the result of the EU Biotechnology Directive. The situation has been very 
different, however, in relation to computer programs and computer-generated inventions, where 
questions of subject matter have frequently arisen. On this, see L. BENTLY & B. SHERMAN, 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 475–96 (4th ed. 2014). 
7. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (quoting S. Rep. No. 1979, at 5 (1952); 
H.R. Rep. No. 1923, at 6 (1952)). 
8. As the Supreme Court said in Chakrabarty, “we begin, of course, with the language of the 
statute.” Id. at 308. The formulaic nature of the inquiry is reflected in the revised USPTO guidelines, 
which treat the subject matter inquiry like an algorithm to be applied and followed. See Memorandum 
from Andrew H. Hirshfeld, Deputy Comm’r for Patent Examination Policy, to the Patent Examining 
Corps (Mar. 4, 2014), http://www.uspto.gov/patents/law/exam/myriad-mayo_guidance.pdf [http://
perma.cc/74ND-NDQX]. 
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provides that an inventor may obtain a patent for a “new and useful process, 
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful 
improvement thereof . . . .”9 This is then followed by the rider that an invention 
that falls prima facie within § 101 may still be ineligible for patent protection if it falls 
within one of the categories of excluded subject matter, namely, laws of nature, 
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.10 In contrast to the situation in Europe 
where the excluded categories have largely been provided by the legislature,11 the 
excluded categories in the United States have been developed piecemeal by the 
courts:12 they are said to be implicit in the relevant legislative provisions. While there 
are many unanswered questions about the scope and nature of the categories of 
excluded subject matter, not least how they relate to each other,13 in recent years 
they have been treated as givens by the courts. With “laws of nature,” “natural 
phenomena,” and “abstract ideas” effectively acting as de facto statutory exceptions, 
the task for U.S. courts is to categorize and classify subject matter. In the Myriad 
litigation, for example, the question for consideration was whether the subject 
matter was to be classified as a nonpatentable product of nature or as a patent 
eligible invention.14 
In Australia, the starting point for the subject-matter inquiry is also with the 
relevant statutory provisions, which provide that an invention is prima facie 
a patentable invention if it is a “manner of manufacture” within the meaning 
of section 6 of the 1623 Statute of Monopolies.15 Typically, this is followed by a 
reminder that the Jacobean words of the legislation should not be read literally. 
Instead, subject matter eligibility is meant to be determined on the basis of principles 
and concepts the courts have developed in applying section 6.16 Although the courts 
have not been as clear as they might have been in distilling the scope of these 
principles, they are often reduced to the positive requirement that to be patent 
eligible, there must be some sort of human interaction with preexisting materials 
 
9. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
10. See, e.g., Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012); 
Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010); Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 307–10; Gottschalk v. Benson, 
409 U.S. 63, 67–68 (1972); O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (1 How.) 62 (1853). 
11. See Convention on the Grant of European Patents, art. 53, Oct. 5, 1973 [hereinafter 
European Patent Convention]. 
12. See Christopher Beauchamp, Patenting Nature: A Problem of History, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 
257, 264 (2013). In Bilski, it was suggested that the exceptions go back 150 years. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 
3225. 
13. One of the advantages of the Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l and Mayo decisions is that they 
focus attention on the categories more directly. See Alice Corp. Pty., Ltd. v. CLS Bank, Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 
2347, 2354 (2014); Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1293. 
14. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2111 (2013); see 
also D’Arcy v Myriad Genetics, Inc [2014] FCAFC 115, ¶ 1 (Austl.). 
15. Patents Act 1990 (Cth) s 18(1) (Austl.). 
16. See, e.g., Myriad [2014] FCAFC 3, ¶ 113 (citing Nat’l Research Dev. Corp. v Comm’r of Patents 
[1959] 102 CLR 252 (Austl.)). 
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that creates something artificial.17 While Australian courts have been at pains to 
distance themselves from the approach adopted in the United States—notably in 
the suggestion that the product-of-nature doctrine does not exist in Australian 
patent law18—the approach in Australia is nonetheless conceptually very similar (if 
not identical) to the approach that has been employed in the United States. While 
the categories may be labelled differently and the courts may emphasise different 
aspects of the inquiry,19 the process of determining whether subject matter is patent 
eligible is the same in the United States and Australia: it is essentially a taxonomic 
exercise of labelling, classifying, and categorizing.20 
Over time, a number of different approaches have been used to decide how 
patentable subject matter is to be classified. While the approaches often overlap and 
are sometimes used inconsistently and with little analysis, it is still possible to distill 
a number of distinct techniques that have been used to categorize subject matter as 
either patent eligible or patent ineligible. Unlike much of the secondary literature, 
which has tended to focus on the consequences of granting or not granting 
protection, the approaches that have been adopted by the courts when classifying 
subject matter are, for the most part, essentially conceptual in nature:21 they stand 
or fall on the way that concepts are construed, applied, and interpreted. In the 
following Section, I will explain some of the key characteristics of the different 
approaches used to categorize subject matter. 
A. Natural Kinds 
One of the oldest and perhaps the most problematic ways of categorizing 
subject matter is one that does so on the basis that the subject matter is by its very 
nature the type or kind of thing that belongs in a particular category. Where this 
approach is applied, patent law effectively operates as if there were natural kinds 
that correspond to a preordained grouping or ordering that determines how things 
are to be classified.22 In these situations, courts assess the subject matter and classify 
it on the basis of whether it shares or exhibits certain (usually unstated) 
 
17. There must be a human intervention “to produce from, or by means of, a naturally occurring 
product or the laws of nature, something artificial or of an artificial effect . . . .” Id. ¶ 168. 
18. Id. ¶ 114. 
19. In both cases, the choice is whether to categorize subject matter as either patent eligible or 
as patent ineligible. The key difference is the focus of attention. While American case law tends to focus 
on patent ineligibility (the excluded categories), Australian patent law focuses on patent eligibility 
(artificial effect). 
20. The “central question” is whether the subject matter “falls within the category of inventions 
to which, by definition, the application of the Act is confined.” Myriad [2014] FCAFC ¶ 115. 
21. While the elaboration of these conceptual questions involves policy choices, such matters 
are nearly always implicit to the conceptual inquiries that underpinned. In this sense, the doctrinal 
questions embody policy arguments, but without the need for any empirical support. 
22. See, e.g., Blumenthal v. Burrell, 53 F. 105, 107 (2d Cir. 1892). Blumenthal held that claims to a 
purified form of chymosin (an enzyme found in the stomach of pigs which was used to curdle milk in 
cheese production) were patentable because the enzyme was “not merely an improved, but an absolutely 
new, article, having its own distinctive nature . . . .” Id. 
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characteristics or traits that warrant or demand that it be classified in a particular 
way. 
In product-of-nature cases, the idea that some things are by their “nature” of 
a particular type or kind has occasionally been used to categorize things as ineligible 
products of nature. It has not, however, been used so much to classify things as 
patent eligible. In many cases, a decision that something is of the type or kind that 
warrants (or demands) it be classified as an unpatentable product of nature is not 
contentious. Thus, it has been readily and widely accepted that the discovery of a 
new mineral or a new plant found in the wild, or a human kidney removed from the 
body, would be products of nature and as such should be “free to all men and 
reserved exclusively to none.”23 In the context of the Myriad litigation, the idea that 
subject matter could be classified according to its essential traits was used to 
categorize human genes in situ. This was reflected in the fact that it was widely 
accepted that genomic DNA—“as a portion of a larger native strand within a cell, 
which in turn is located within the human body”24—was a product of nature and, 
as such, was not eligible for patent protection.25 The Solicitor General captured the 
views of many when he said that in their preisolated form—“as a portion of a larger 
native gene within a cell—the BRCA sequences clearly are products of nature.”26 
In the Myriad litigation, the idea that certain things were in essence products 
of nature was, with the exception of the raw gDNA, very contentious. While critics 
of the patents argued that human genes were “quintessential products of nature,”27 
supporters of the patents took an opposing view and argued that they were “true 
inventions.”28 Although the U.S. Supreme Court and the Australian Federal Court, 
like many of the lower courts, accepted that raw gDNA in the human body was by 
its very nature the kind of thing that ought to be classified as a nonpatentable 
product of nature,29 beyond this the courts did not use essentialist arguments to 
reach any substantive conclusions. 
There are a number of problems with such essentialist arguments: one of the 
most important is that there is rarely if ever any explanation given as to why subject 
matter is classified in the way that it is. Instead, we are simply presented with bald 
 
23. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980). For an interesting discussion of the role 
and place of kinds in patent law (primarily in relation to patent claims), see Andrew Chin, The Ontological 
Function of the Patent Document, 74 U. PITT. L. REV. 263 (2012). 
24. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 10, Ass’n for 
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013) (No. 12-398). 
25. Id. 
26. Id. at 20. In Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 19 F. Supp. 3d 938, 948 (N.D. Cal. 2013), 
it was assumed that the presence of cffDNA in maternal plasma or serum was a natural phenomenon. 
27. Brief of James D. Watson, Ph.D. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 12, Ass’n 
for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013) (No. 12-398). 
28. Reply Brief for Petitioners at 13, Myriad, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (No. 12-398) (“[New genetic 
technologies] deserve patent protection . . . because they represent true inventions and not because 
resources were poured into their development.”). 
29. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2119 (2013); see 
also D’Arcy v Myriad Genetics, Inc [2014] FCAFC ¶¶ 115, 162–63, 171 (Austl.). 
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statements that build upon a belief that the subject matter is the type of thing that 
by its very nature belongs in a particular category. Thus, in the course of the 
litigation, Myriad argued that isolated DNA was patent eligible as a purified natural 
substance.30 This was based on lower court decisions that held that natural 
compounds that had been “so refined and purified through human intervention . . . 
[had] become a substance different ‘in kind’ from the natural product.”31 While such 
statements are understandable and are to be expected from the parties and in the 
amici curiae briefs supporting one or other of the litigants, there is less justification 
for the courts to resort to this mode of reasoning. I will return to the problems with 
this below. 
B. A Change of Name as an Indication of Patent Eligibility 
In some situations, a change of name has been taken as being indicative of a 
change of kind and thus that the matter in question is patent eligible.32 In these 
cases, the fact that something was given a new name was taken to mean that the 
newly named thing was sufficiently different to other things in that class such that 
it qualified as patentable subject matter. For example one of the factors 
(supposedly) taken into account by the Supreme Court in Diamond v. Chakrabarty in 
deciding that the disputed genetically engineered bacterium was patent eligible was 
that it has been christened with a new name: pseudomonas putida.33 As the Court said, 
the claim was “not to a hitherto unknown natural phenomenon, but to a 
nonnaturally occurring manufacture or composition of matter—a product of 
human ingenuity ‘having a distinctive name, character [and] use.’”34 In other 
situations, the fact that subject matter has not been given a new name has been taken 
to suggest that the subject matter is not patent worthy. Thus, in the 1931 decision of 
American Fruit Growers v. Brogdex,35 the Supreme Court reversed the finding of the lower 
 
30. Brief for Respondents at 36–40, Myriad, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (No. 12-398). 
31. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party, supra note 24, at 
25 (citing Kuehmsted v. Farbenfabriken of Elberfeld Co., 179 F. 701 (7th Cir. 1910); Parke-Davis & 
Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95, 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1911); In re Merz, 97 F.2d 599 (C.C.P.A. 1938)). In 
these cited cases, the key question was: what were the traits that gave rise to a new thing? 
32. For example, in Intervet Inc. v. Merial Ltd., it was held that DNA constructs encoding a type 
of porcine circovirus as a new type of virus “comports with the way that viruses are typically classified 
in the relevant art.” Intervet Inc. v. Merial Ltd., 617 F.3d 1282, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
33. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 310 (1980). 
34. Id. at 309–10 (citing Hartranft v. Wiegmann, 121 U.S. 609, 615 (1887)). 
35. American Fruit Growers v. Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. 1 (1931) (overturning the District Court of 
Delaware and the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit). For earlier decisions construing “manufacture,” 
see Hartranft, 121 U.S. at 609–11. In Hartranft, the Supreme Court determined that shells cleaned by 
acid and then ground on an emery wheel were not manufactured shells and thus were exempt from 
duty: “There is no difference in name and use between the shells ground on the emery wheel and those 
not ground.” Id.; see also Anheuser-Busch Brewing Ass’n v. United States, 207 U.S. 556 (1908) (assessing 
whether corks had been “manufactured” in the United States and thus able to receive a rebate). 
“Manufacture implies a change, but every change is not manufacture, and yet every change . . . is the 
result of treatment, labor, and manipulation. But something more is necessary . . . .” Anheuser-Busch 
Brewing Ass’n, 207 U.S. at 562 (citing Hartranft, 121 U.S. at 609). “There must be a transformation; a new 
and different article must emerge, ‘having a distinctive name, character, or use.’” Id. 
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court and held that an orange dipped in a solution of borax to render the skin mold 
resistant was not a manufactured article and thus not patentable.36 One of the reasons 
for this was that there was “no change in the name, appearance, or general character 
of the fruit. It remains a fresh orange, fit only for the same beneficial uses as 
theretofore.”37 
The role that naming plays in the patent process is evident in the practices of 
American industrial microbiologists in the 1940s and 1950s. While plant breeders 
in the early part of the twentieth century decided that they needed to develop a 
stabilized and accepted set of naming practices before they were in a position to 
seek intellectual property protection for new plants (which they achieved when the 
Plant Patent Act was passed in 193038), the situation was not the same in relation to 
industrial microbiology, where patenting occurred before taxonomic and 
nomenclatural practices had been stabilized.39 One of the interesting things about 
the discussions concerning microbiological taxonomy that occurred in the scientific 
literature in the 1950s were the complaints made about the way that patent lawyers 
were abusing the naming process to their own ends.40 In particular, faced with a 
growing number of microbiological inventions, would-be patentees increasingly 
found it difficult to show that their inventions were novel. One of the tactics used 
to avoid this problem was to rename the microbiological inventions in question. 
While this may have annoyed taxonomists (since it added to the already high levels 
of nomenclatural confusion), it allowed patentees to pretend that their inventions 
were novel (which was difficult to disprove). Similar tactics were also used when 
someone wanted to use a patented microbiological invention but did not want to 
pay for that use. By giving a patented microbe used in an industrial process a new 
name, competitors were able to argue that they were not infringing the patent: a 
new name was indicative of a new thing. 
Given that the subject-matter inquiry is effectively a process of (legal) 
classification or taxonomy, it is not surprising that patent law has drawn upon a 
change of name when deciding whether subject matter is patent eligible. This is 
 
36. American Fruit Growers, 283 U.S. at 12. 
37. Id. at 11–12; see also In re Ewald, 129 F.2d 340, 342 (C.C.P.A. 1942) (holding that a cored 
pear was not a manufacture because it did not possess a new name, character, or use); Robert C. Cook, 
The First Plant Patent, 22 J. HEREDITY 313, 317–18 (1931); Donald W. Strickland, Recent Decisions, 47 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 242, 245–46 (1978). 
38. 35 U.S.C. § 161 (2012). 
39. See Elio Baldacci, The Classification of Actinomycetes in Relation to Their Antibiotic Activity, 3 
ADVANCES IN APPLIED MICROBIOLOGY 257, 276 (Wayne W. Umbreit ed., 1961) (showing 
that inventors abandoned the traditional practice of first publishing in a scientific publication in order 
to give a new species a new name and to avoid patent infringement); Selman A. Waksman, Species Concept 
Among the Actinomycetes with Special Reference to the Genus Streptomyces, 21 BACTERIOLOGICAL REVS. 1, 13 
(1957). Waksman illustrates the use of naming as a legal strategy in cases where “Company A . . . 
presents claims that to produce the same antibiotic or vitamin it is using a different species than that 
claimed in the patent granted to Company B. This is done, of course, to avoid patent infringements.” 
Waksman, supra. On this, see ALAIN POTTAGE & BRAD SHERMAN, FIGURES OF INVENTION: A 
HISTORY OF MODERN PATENT LAW 183–206 (2010). 
40. See Baldacci, supra note 39, at 257. 
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reinforced by the important role that taxonomic practices play in other areas of 
patent law.41 While taxonomic practices play and continue to play a pivotal role in 
patent law in describing biological innovations and in ensuring that patented 
biological inventions are enabled (disclosed),42 they do not offer any real assistance 
in deciding whether something qualifies as patentable subject matter. 
One of the problems with using a change of name as an indicator of a change 
of kind or type relevant to the subject-matter inquiry is that it defers the decision 
about patentability to another forum that is not necessarily any better equipped to 
decide these issues. One of the lessons to draw from the way that names of 
microbiological inventions were manipulated in the 1950s is that a change of name 
is not necessarily indicative of a change of kind. As such, it not something that can 
always be relied upon. Relying upon change of name is also problematic because 
the process of giving something a new name usually tells us very little about the 
thing itself. To the extent that it does, this is not relevant to the subject-matter 
inquiry, because while the process of naming a new plant, animal, microorganism, 
or gene does require judgment (particularly in terms of how the new thing is similar 
to and different from other objects in the class to which it is attached), this is not a 
process that adds much to the subject-matter inquiry. The reason for this is that the 
taxonomic process is one that is not equipped or designed to pass judgment, at least 
in a way that is of any assistance in the subject-matter inquiry. 
While taxonomy is a process that depends on difference, it is not a process 
that passes judgment over that difference.43 Instead, once difference is established, 
taxonomy moves on: the primary focus is on fixing the name, the type specimen, 
and the description of the named object. Here, the primary goal is to enable objects 
and people to circulate, and for things to be recognized at a distance. This is not the 
case with the subject-matter inquiry in patent law, which depends on some type of 
(unspecified) qualitative change.44 
C. Is There an Invention? 
While courts occasionally make decisions about how subject matter is to be 
classified on the basis that it exhibits the essential characteristics associated with the 
category in question or on the basis that the subject matter has been christened with 
a new name, these are, at best, marginal considerations. Instead, courts have tended 
to rely upon three different approaches when deciding whether something is patent 
 
41. See Brad Sherman, Taxonomic Property, 67 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 560, 574 (2008). 
42. It also potentially plays a role in determining the novelty of inventions. 
43. All that the naming of a new plant variety tells us is that the new plant simultaneously shares 
certain defining characteristics with plants in that species and, at the same time, that it has at least one 
characteristic that distinguishes it from other plants in that species. 
44. The problems that arise in using a change of name as an indication of a patent-worthy 
change of kind are more problematic when we move beyond biological inventions. While most of the 
would-be inventions that potentially fall within the product of nature exclusion would be governed by 
the sophisticated rules of taxonomy and nomenclature that have developed over the last century, this 
is not the case with many other inventions. 
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eligible. The first approach used to classify subject matter does so on the basis of 
the labor used to create the invention. A second approach focuses on whether or 
not there is an inventive concept somehow associated with the subject matter in 
question. A third approach used to classify subject matter operates on the basis that 
a nature-based invention will only be patent eligible if the invention is “markedly 
different”45 (or in Australian terms “different”46) from the raw material on which it 
is based. 
While there are differences between the three approaches, they are all 
underpinned by the same question, namely, is there an invention?47 More 
specifically, each of the approaches used to determine subject matter eligibility 
implicitly builds upon an image of how inventions come into being—an image, in 
effect, of the process of invention. It is important to note that the image of how 
inventions are generated that is employed in patent law is a legal one. Patent law 
does not attempt to reproduce laboratory life in a legal setting or to mirror or 
recreate scientific practice. Instead, the model of invention is one that marries a 
conception of scientific and technical creation with particular policy ends. 
In essence, the process of invention that underpins the subject-matter inquiry 
is relatively straightforward. In the context of nature-based inventions, this is one 
in which the invention is a product of a process in which a human agent (or 
inventor) exercises their inventive skills to build on, modify, or adapt preexisting 
natural materials. In this context the “raw materials” act as the foundation or 
building blocks for the inventive process. A similar image of the inventive process 
is used in relation to laws of nature and abstract ideas. As the Supreme Court said 
in Mayo, “all inventions at some level embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws 
of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas.”48 Given the pivotal role that these 
raw materials and ideas play in the inventive process—“they are the basic tools of 
scientific and technological work”49—it is not surprising that the courts are 
constantly vigilant to ensure that they are protected, preserved, and maintained and 
not subject to patent protection. It is here that the excluded categories come into 
their own: they operate to protect the a priori domain. In the context of the Myriad 
litigation, this was reflected in the belief that people should not be restricted in their 
ability to study, use, or research native gDNA. To allow patents to be granted over 
the raw materials of the inventive process would, as the Solicitor General said, 
unduly compromise the public’s ability to study and use nature50 and in so doing 
 
45. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 222 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
46. See D’Arcy v Myriad Genetics Inc [2014] FCAFC 115, ¶ 211 (Austl.). 
47. As William Robinson said, has there been a human-made invention? 1 WILLIAM C. 
ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS 114, 115 (1890). 
48. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012). 
49. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116 (2013) (citing 
Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1292). Protecting these basic tools would be “at odds with the very point of patents, 
which exist to promote creation.” Id. 
50. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party, supra note 24,  
at 9. 
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“unduly restrict the public’s study and productive use of resources found in the 
natural world.”51 
The second stage of the inventive process sees the human inventor, as an agent 
of change, interact with the preexisting natural materials to produce something new. 
Here, the inventor is tasked with the job of using “inventive” skills to change, mold, 
or rearrange a transcendent, preexisting nature into something new, something that 
is “markedly different” from what has preceded it. In Australia, this is reflected in 
the idea that for subject matter to be patent eligible, it must be the product of 
“human intervention that creates an artificial state of affairs.”52 Importantly, to be 
patentable the inventor must act in such a way so as to “individualize” nature.53 
While an inventor may not impose their personality on the resulting invention in 
the way the Romantic author is presumed to mark the texts that they write, they do 
shape or mold the invention. In this sense, the notion of individualization gives rise 
to the suggestion that the patented subject matter is somehow “unique,” whether in 
terms of its “originality” or its novelty. It is this (relative) uniqueness that allows the 
logic of the patent doctrine to suggest that patents, by their very nature, do not 
preempt. 
By stipulating that patents are only ever granted for inventions that 
“individualize” nature, patent law can proceed on the basis that patents will not 
preempt subsequent uses of the underlying raw materials. Under this logic, a 
patented invention does not monopolize nature because an invention is defined as 
something that builds upon, expands, or modifies the underlying raw natural 
material. As a result of the intervention and action of the human inventor, the 
resulting invention is necessarily different from the natural materials that it is based 
on. Under this logic, it is then easy to conclude that patented inventions do not 
monopolize laws or products of nature.54 In this sense, the image of invention that 
underpins the tests used to determine subject matter eligibility ensures that the grant 
of a patent based on raw materials does not preempt or preclude others from using 
those raw materials. Demanding that patents are only issued on raw materials that 
have been individualized creates, in the words of the Solicitor General, “no risk of 
preempting other uses of the raw materials from which cDNA is created.”55 The 
same logic applies to laws of nature and to abstract ideas. 
Armed with this (fictitious) image of the process of invention, we are now in 
a position to revisit the different approaches used to categorize subject matter. In 
 
51. Id. at 11. 
52. D’Arcy v Myriad Genetics Inc [2014] FCAFC 115, ¶ 11 (Austl.). 
53. On this, see D’Arcy v Myriad Genetics Inc [2015] HCA 35, ¶ 116 (Austl.); BRAD SHERMAN & 
LIONEL BENTLY, THE MAKING OF MODERN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: THE BRITISH 
EXPERIENCE 1760–1911, at 46 (1999); and Brad Sherman, Before the High Court—D’Arcy v Myriad 
Genetics Inc: Patenting Genes in Australia, 37 SYDNEY L. REV. 135, 138 (2015). 
54. It is this logic that allowed the Solicitor General to argue that human made inventions do 
not monopolize laws or products of nature. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Neither Party, supra note 24, at 13. 
55. Id. at 10. 
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effect, what happens where questions about subject matter arise is that one or more 
aspects of the inventive process are called into question. Given that all elements of 
the process of invention must be present for there to be a (legal) invention, if one 
element is missing, the subject matter is deemed to be patent ineligible. 
Each of the different approaches used to determine subject matter eligibility 
corresponds to a specific feature of the inventive process. In effect what each of 
the approaches does is to ask whether the element in question is present in a way 
that is (or is meant to be) appropriate to the matter in hand. For example, in the 
case of the test of marked difference, the focus is on the end product and its 
relationship to the materials that it is based on. Here the inventor silently operates 
in the background as the agent of change. In the case of a labor-centered approach, 
the focus is on the work of the inventor and whether or not they have exercised the 
requisite skill to individualize nature. The test for the existence of an inventive 
concept is similar to the labor-centered approach, except that it is does not focus 
specifically on the effort of the inventor. Instead it looks for evidence of the 
existence of an inventive concept either in the subject matter or in the process by 
which the subject matter was generated. 
In reflecting upon the different tests, it is important to note that while the 
process of categorization may be an all or nothing exercise,56 the tests used to 
classify subject matter are not. One of the consequences of accepting that “all 
inventions at some level embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, 
natural phenomena, or abstract ideas”57 is that it ensures that the subject-matter 
inquiry is always a question of degree. Indeed, as the Solicitor General said (in 
relation to the inquiry into marked difference) “patent-eligibility depends on the 
degree to which the purported invention differs from its naturally occurring 
antecedent.”58 Similar comments apply where the labor of the inventor or the 
existence of an inventive concept is used to classify subject matter. 
In the fictitious model of invention described above, the role of the inventor 
is to individualize the raw materials. While they may not impose their personality on 
the resulting product, the notion of individualization gives rise to the suggestion 
that the patented subject matter is somehow “unique,” whether in terms of its 
originality or its novelty. It is this uniqueness that allows the logic of the patent 
doctrine to suggest that patents, by their very nature, do not preempt.59 The 
problem with this, however, is that this is clearly not the case. Indeed, one of the 
 
56. Dan L. Burk, Edifying Thoughts of a Patent Watcher: The Nature of DNA, 60 UCLA L. REV. 
DISCOURSE 92, 101 (2013). 
57. Mayo Collaborative Serv. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012). 
58. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party, supra note 24, at 
32. 
59. As one amicus argued, cDNA molecules do not occur naturally (other than in rare cases), 
but must be synthesized in the laboratory. Because of this, there is no risk that patenting will tie up 
other uses of the natural raw materials involved in the creation of the cDNA. Brief for the 
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 
16, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013) (No. 12-398). 
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fundamental features of patents is that they can be used to stop people from doing 
certain things. If, as the Supreme Court has repeatedly said, “all inventions at some 
level embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural phenomena, 
or abstract ideas,”60 then it must be the case that all patents, to some extent, 
potentially preempt. At the very least, they must potentially prevent others from 
using (or individualizing) nature in the way that is disclosed in the patent. As such, 
the concern is not really about preemption per se. Rather, the complaint is about 
the extent of preemption. With a patent over raw materials, it is extremely broad. 
While a patent over an invention that modifies raw material should not (in theory) 
restrict use of the raw materials generally, it does restrict (or preempt) access and 
use of the modified raw materials, if only in terms of the particular way that the 
materials have been deployed in the patented invention. The situation is similar with 
a patent that draws upon an abstract idea or a law of nature. The question in all 
these cases is: What degree of preemption is acceptable? With these general points 
in mind, I now turn to look in more detail at the different tests that have been used 
to categorize subject matter. 
1. Labor 
Over the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, one of the key 
factors that shaped the emergence of intellectual property law generally and patent 
law specifically was the labor involved in the generation of intellectual assets and 
how that labor was perceived.61 While labor may no longer be as important as it 
once was, it is still sometimes used to categorize subject matter in patent law. A 
labor-centered approach is one in which the courts focus on the role that the 
inventor plays in the production of the subject matter to decide how that subject 
matter should be categorized. The application of this approach can be seen, for 
example, in J.E.M. Ag Supply Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc. where the 
Supreme Court said that the dividing line between an unpatentable product of 
nature and a patent eligible invention was human ingenuity: the distinction was “not 
‘between living and inanimate things, but between products of nature, whether 
living or not, and human-made inventions.’”62 In part, the decision to use labor as 
a guide to categorize subject matter draws upon the fact that something that is 
“naturally occurring” is, almost by definition, “unaltered by the hand of man.”63 
Thus while unaltered naturally occurring organisms are not patentable (as in Funk 
Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co.), altered nonnaturally occurring organisms are 
(as in Chakrabarty).64 
 
60. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1293. 
61. See generally SHERMAN & BENTLY, supra note 53, at 1760–1911. 
62. J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 130 (2001) (citing 
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 313 (1980)). 
63. In re Roslin Institute (Edinburgh), 750 F.3d 1333, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
64. See id. In Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 132 (1948), the “patent that 
claimed a mixture of naturally occurring strains of bacteria that helped leguminous plants extract 
nitrogen from the air and fix it in soil” was held not to be patent eligible “because the patentee did not 
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Over the last decade, courts have frequently looked at the labor exercised in 
the development of subject matter when deciding whether that subject matter is 
patent eligible. In defending their patents, Myriad took a similar approach when 
they suggested that it would be “judicious to determine patent-eligibility based on 
the presence of human ingenuity.”65 In line with this, proponents of Myriad’s 
patents highlighted the effort that went into the creation of the subject matter 
protected by the patents. As one amicus argued, “[e]xtensive human intervention is 
required to isolate specific DNA molecules” from the host organism.66 
There are currently two different approaches taken by the courts when using 
labor as a means to judge subject matter eligibility. Under one approach, the courts 
seem reluctant to impose qualitative limits on the type of labor that is able to confer 
patent eligibility on subject matter.67 While this does not mean that there are no 
limits on the type of labor that is able to confer eligibility on subject matter—there 
are many types of labor that would be dismissed out of hand as being inappropriate 
or irrelevant—there is a sense in which, within certain parameters, the mere exercise 
of labor, skill, and effort will be enough to render subject matter patent eligible. In 
this situation, the mere fact that a scientist, for example, has exerted labor and effort 
in the generation of the subject matter is enough for that subject matter to be 
deemed patent eligible. There are a number of advantages with this approach; not 
least that it is easy to apply and easy for third parties to predict outcomes. 
Depending on how the approach is applied, however, it may also lead to a lowering 
of standards and to an increase in what can be patented. 
The second way in which labor has been used to decide how subject matter is 
classified is where the courts are more willing to impose qualitative limitations on 
the type of labor that transforms raw materials into something that is patent eligible. 
This approach is underpinned by the idea that the mere fact that someone has 
exerted labor to create something—that raw materials have been “altered by the 
hand of man”68—is not necessarily enough for it to qualify as patentable subject 
matter. In turn, this is premised on the idea that not all types of labor are sufficient 
to confer patent eligible status on subject matter. Thus, even though it may take 
“significant effort and creativity” to “discover the natural law or substance and to 
 
alter the bacteria in any way.” In re Roslin, 750 F.3d at 1336. “[T]here is no invention here unless the 
discovery that certain strains of the several species of these bacteria are non-inhibitive and may thus be 
safely mixed is invention. But we cannot so hold without allowing a patent to issue on one of the ancient 
secrets of nature now disclosed.” Id. (quoting Funk Bros., 333 U.S. 127 at 132). 
65. Brief for Respondents, supra note 30, at 33. 
66. Brief for the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Respondents, supra note 59, at 2–3. As the Supreme Court said in Myriad, the central dispute 
at the Federal Circuit was “whether the act of isolating DNA . . . is an inventive act.” Ass’n for Molecular 
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2114 (2013). 
67. For a discussion on the role of labor in patent law, see SHERMAN & BENTLY, supra note 53. 
68. For a discussion of this idea of “anything under the sun that is made by man,” see Diamond 
v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (quoting S. Rep. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., at 5 (1952); 
H.R. Rep. No. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., at 6 (1952)). 
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appreciate its potential utility,”69 this high level “creation” is not patentable. The 
situation is the same with the discovery of laws of nature and the development of 
abstract ideas. In these cases, no amount of skill or labor will allow someone to 
patent the fundamental raw materials that underpin the inventive process. It is also 
clear that the mere fact that someone has exerted labor and effort to modify and 
change raw materials will not necessarily be enough to guarantee that the resulting 
subject matter is patent worthy. This is because patent law only recognizes certain 
types of labor, often unhelpfully described as inventive labor, as giving rise to 
patentable subject matter.70 This need to exercise a particular type of labor was 
reflected in the comments of the Solicitor General, which were adopted by the 
Supreme Court in Myriad, that “[s]ynthesized genetic materials such as cDNA are 
patent-eligible subject matter because they do not occur in nature but instead are 
the product of significant human creativity.”71 It was also reflected in the comment 
by the Supreme Court in relation to the isolated gDNA that “Myriad did not create 
anything. To be sure, it found an important and useful gene, but separating that 
gene from its surrounding genetic material is not an act of invention”72: labor, but 
not the right type of labor. 
Once the decision was made that only certain types of labor exercised in 
certain ways is able to render subject matter patent eligible, it was not only necessary 
for decision makers to be able to distinguish between these different types of labor, 
they also had to be able to provide justifications for doing so. In this situation it 
was necessary for them to be able to explain why, for example, that a certain type 
of labor was deemed “creative” enough to produce something that was potentially 
patentable, while other labor was not. It may be possible to talk at an abstract level 
about classes of labor (such as the effort of a laboratory manager who plays an 
important but noninventive role in the generation of a new technology). Beyond 
this, however, it is much more difficult to use labor, skill, and effort as a means to 
categorize subject matter, at least in a way that does not appear to be arbitrary. As I 
demonstrate below, it is the inability of decision makers to do this that lies at the 
heart of many of the problems facing patent law in this context. The problems that 
arise when using labor to categorize subject matter are compounded by the fact that 
it is not clear what is being judged here. Is it the case, for example, that parties need 
to produce evidence of the skill and effort actually used to generate the subject 
matter (as with inventive step)—which seems to run counter to the idea that the 
 
69. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party, supra note 24, at 
9–10. 
70. See generally Teets v. Chromalloy Gas Turbine Corp., 83 F.3d 403 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
71. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party, supra note 24, at 
9. “Nature does not create cDNA; only laboratory scientists do” (in contrast to mRNA and native 
DNA). Brief for University of Baltimore/Johns Hopkins University Center for Medicine & Law et al. 
as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 11, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 
133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013) (No. 12-398). “The real problem lies in knowing . . . what degree of human 
intervention is necessary before it can be concluded that the requisite artificial state of affairs exists.” 
Cancer Voices Austl. v Myriad Genetics, Inc. [2013] FCA 65, ¶ 102 (Austl.). 
72. Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2117. 
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subject-matter inquiry is a preliminary examination—or is it that the case that the 
decision is made on the basis of the indicative labor used to generate subject matter 
of the type in question? 
Given the uncertainty about the type, degree, and amount of labor needed to 
render subject matter patent worthy, it is not surprising that where labor is used to 
categorize subject matter that the focus of attention often shifts to the product of 
that labor. In these instances, the labor of the inventor is treated as a proxy for 
change, which is reflected in the end product and the fact that is markedly different 
from the raw materials on which it is based. This can be seen in the now repealed 
2001 USPTO Utility Examination Guidelines that stated that isolated and purified 
naturally occurring DNA was patent eligible.73 While the shift away from a focus 
on the labor used to generate subject matter as an end in its own right toward the 
change that the labor has on the (more concrete) resulting product may have some 
advantages, it does not really solve the problem of how subject matter is to be 
classified so much as defer the question to another area of doctrine, which (as we 
will see below), has its own problems. 
2. “Inventive Concept” 
Another approach used to classify subject matter is one that does so on the 
basis of whether the subject matter incorporates an inventive concept. This is 
premised on the idea that to be patent eligible, subject matter that is based on a law 
of nature, natural phenomenon, or an abstract idea must include an “inventive 
concept.”74 In Alice Corp.—which considered whether a patent for a computer-
implemented invention designed to facilitate securities trading was excluded on the 
basis that it was for an abstract idea—the test for eligibility was presented as a two-
stage process.75 First, it is necessary to identify whether the claim in question was 
directed to an abstract idea.76 It is then necessary to examine the claims to determine 
whether they contain an “inventive concept” sufficient to transform the abstract 
idea into something that is patent eligible.77 A similar approach is sometimes used 
when deciding whether subject matter is excluded on the basis that it embodies 
natural phenomenon or a law of nature. In one sense, the use of the existence of an 
inventive concept as a means of categorizing subject matter is similar to the 
approach outlined above, whereby subject matter is categorized on the basis of the 
type or quality of labor used to generate the subject matter in question. In other 
senses, however, it is different. Specifically, while a labor-centered approach focuses 
on the role that the inventor plays in the production of the subject matter, this 
approach looks more holistically at the inventive process, at the individualization of 
 
73. USPTO Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092 ( Jan. 5, 2001). 
74. See Alice Corp. Pty., Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l., 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355 (2014) (quoting Mayo 
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294 (2012)). 
75. Id. at 2351–52, 2355. 
76. Id. at 2355. 
77. Id. at 2357. 
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nature, and asks whether there is something “inventive” in that process. The role 
that inventiveness is able to play in classifying nature-based subject matter can be 
seen in Ariosa Diagnostics v. Sequenom, Inc., where Judge Illston of the Northern 
District of California said that a claim will not be patentable if the only innovation 
in the patent was the use of natural phenomenon.78 On the facts, the court held that 
amplifying and detecting paternal cell-free foetal DNA (cffDNA) was not 
patentable because the techniques were conventional in the field.79 Here the 
absence of an inventive concept was taken as an indicator of the ineligibility of the 
subject matter. 
3. “Markedly Different” 
Yet another approach used to categorize subject matter is one that does so on 
the basis of whether the matter in question is “markedly different” from the natural 
material on which it is based.80 This approach, which played an important role in 
deciding the fate of Myriad’s patents, is captured in the comment that a patent may 
be issued for “a modified natural substance if the modified version is sufficiently 
different from its naturally occurring antecedent.”81 It is also reflected in the remark 
that “[t]he patent-eligibility of a modified natural substance depends on whether the 
modified substance is so ‘markedly’ different from its natural predecessor as to 
warrant the conclusion that the claimant has invented something new.”82 Although 
this approach has a long pedigree, many of the recent U.S. decisions that categorized 
subject matter on the basis of how the subject matter differs from the raw materials 
on which it is based cited Chakrabarty, where the Supreme Court held that the 
modified bacterium was eligible subject matter because it had “markedly different 
characteristics from any found in nature and one having the potential for significant 
utility.”83 While the Australian Federal Court said that the test of “marked 
 
78. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 19 F. Supp. 3d 938, 949–50 (N.D. Cal. 2013). 
79. Id. On this, see Christopher M. Holman, District Court’s Interpretation of Mayo in Ariosa 
Diagnostics Does Not Bode Well for Patent Eligibility of Diagnostics and Personalized Medicine, 33 
BIOTECHNOLOGY L. REP. 46, 47 (2014). 
80. On this basis, discoveries that possess “markedly different characteristics from any found 
in nature” are eligible for patent protection. In contrast, any existing organism or newly discovered 
plant found in the wild is not patentable. In re Roslin Institute (Edinburgh), 750 F.3d 1333, 1336 (Fed. 
Cir. 2014); see also In re Beineke, 690 F.3d 1344, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1243 (2013) 
(holding that a newly discovered type of plant is not eligible for plant patent protection, in part, because 
such a plant was not “in any way the result of [the patent applicant’s] creative efforts or indeed anyone’s 
creative efforts.”). 
81. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party, supra note 24, at 
10. 
82. Id. at 14 (citing Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309–10 (1980)); Mayo Collaborative 
Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1302 (2012). 
83. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 310. “The inventor had altered a naturally occurring bacterium by 
transferring to it several plasmids that altered the bacterium’s structure and imbued it with the ability 
to break down crude oil—a ‘property[ ] which [was] possessed by no naturally occurring bacteria.’” Brief 
for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party, supra note 24, at 14–15 (quoting 
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 305). 
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difference” had no place in Australian law, the decision that the isolated gDNA was 
patent eligible was made on the basis that the isolated DNA was different to the 
raw gDNA.84 
As with each of the different tests used to categorize subject matter, the test 
for marked difference focuses on a specific aspect of the inventive process, namely, 
the end product and its relationship to the materials on which it is based. In effect, 
the test asks: Has the composition of matter been sufficiently changed so that it is 
no longer a product of nature? By ensuring that patents are only granted for 
inventions that are markedly different from the underlying raw materials that they 
are based on, it is possible to argue that the grant of a patent does not take anything 
away from anyone. The gap between nature and invention that is guaranteed by the 
product-of-nature doctrine ensures that patents do not unduly prevent third parties 
from working with the underlying raw materials. This logic underpinned the 
argument made by the Solicitor General, which was effectively adopted by the 
Supreme Court, that cDNA should be patentable. The Solicitor General began by 
arguing that the cDNA was markedly different to the underlying material that it was 
derived from.85 This was because the process of creating synthetic DNA “involves 
significant manipulation of the underlying natural substances to create a substance 
that is new and different.”86 As a result, the cDNA molecule “has a different 
nucleotide sequence than DNA created naturally within the cell.”87 Drawing on the 
fact that the cDNA was different from the underlying raw materials, the Solicitor 
General argued that “[e]xtending patent protection to cDNAs therefore poses no 
risk of ‘tying up’ other uses of the natural raw materials involved in the creation of 
cDNA.”88 That is, a patent on a “particular cDNA molecule leaves others free to 
study and exploit the original native DNA, RNA, and mRNA molecule that were 
used to create the cDNA.”89 As these substances can be removed from their cellular 
environment and studied without creating the cDNA, it was possible to argue that 
upholding the patent would not prevent others from working with the original 
naturally occurring microorganism. 
The process of determining whether something is materially different from 
the natural raw materials on which it is based is a two- or possibly three-step process. 
First, it is necessary to determine what is being compared. Specifically, it is necessary 
to determine how the subject matter and the natural material on which it is based 
are to be characterized. Once this is done, it is then necessary to compare the subject 
matter and the raw materials as characterized. In some cases, a third step may be 
needed to determine whether any identified differences are in fact “marked.” 
 
84. See D’Arcy v Myriad Genetics, Inc [2014] FCAFC 115, ¶¶ 114, 213–18 (Austl.). 
85. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party, supra note 24, at 
12. 
86. Id. at 18. 
87. Id. 
88. Id. (citing Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294). 
89. Id. at 12. 
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One of things that is clear from the cases that have used “marked difference” 
(or “difference”) as a means of categorizing subject matter is that the outcomes of 
the decisions often turn on the way that the raw material and the subject matter are 
characterized. One of the problems that underpinned the Myriad litigation, 
particularly in relation to the isolated gDNA, was that the inventions could 
legitimately be characterized in both chemical and genetic terms. In many ways, the 
Myriad litigation can be seen as a dispute over which of these different ways of 
characterizing DNA—which each carried different legal conclusions—should 
dominate. On the one hand, Myriad and their supporters highlighted the chemical 
nature of the inventions.90 Given that both the isolated and synthetic DNA were 
chemically different from the naturally occurring gDNA, this enabled Myriad and 
their supporters to argue that the subject matter was markedly different from the 
raw material which it was based on and, as such, that it was patent eligible. This style 
of argument (which was accepted by the Australian Federal Court91 and by the U.S. 
Federal Circuit92), was summed up in an amicus curiae brief that stated that “[c]laims 
to isolated DNA molecules are patent-eligible, just like the new microorganisms in 
Chakrabarty, because they are novel creations that are chemically different from 
naturally-occurring DNA.”93 While a leaf snapped from a tree remained a leaf, “an 
isolated gene is, as a matter of chemistry, not the same as a gene in a natural 
context.”94 A similar point was made by the Pharmaceutical Research and 
Manufactures of America who said that each “claimed isolated DNA molecule is a 
tangible, human-made chemical compound that differs in structure, function, utility, 
and informational content from its native counterpart. Therefore, none of the 
patent claims at issue in this case read on genes as they exist in the human body.”95 
While supporters of Myriad’s patents highlighted the chemical nature of the 
DNA, opponents of Myriad’s patents lobbied for a genetic reading of the DNA. 
Although the opponents may have been willing to recognize that the DNA could 
be described in chemical terms, they nonetheless argued that the defining and 
distinguishing characteristic of DNA was its ability to “be our instruction book on 
life.”96 As such, the DNA should be viewed genetically. This was reflected in the 
Petitioner’s argument in Myriad that “[g]enes are chemicals, but they are unique 
because they are much more; they embody the information and instructions the 
 
90. Brief for Federal Circuit Bar Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 
14, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (No. 12-398). 
91. D’Arcy v Myriad Genetics, Inc [2014] FCAFC 115 (Austl.). 
92. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
93. Brief for Federal Circuit Bar Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, supra 
note 90, at 14. 
94. Id. 
95. Brief for the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufactures of America as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Respondents, supra note 59, at 3. 
96. Brief for James D. Watson, Ph.D. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party, supra note 
27, at 12. 
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body uses to function.”97 James Watson made a similar point when he described 
human DNA as “a chemical entity, but DNA’s importance flows from its ability to 
encode and transmit the instructions for creating a human being”98 and that the 
“human genome’s ability to be our instruction book on life distinguishes human 
DNA from all other chemicals covered by the patent laws.”99 Given that the 
nucleotides that make up the DNA—or DNA’s information content—remained 
the same in the isolated gene as they were in the gene in the human body, the 
opponents were able to argue (and the Supreme Court ultimately accepted100) that 
when viewed in genetic terms, there was no difference between gDNA and isolated 
gDNA.101 From this perspective, the opponents were able to argue that even though 
the isolated gene may have been chemically different to the gene in its natural state 
(isolation changed the form and structure of the gene by breaking the bonds that 
linked the pieces of the chromosome), this did not matter given that the genes were 
to be viewed genetically rather than chemically. On the basis that the gene sequences 
were the same when they were in the body as when they were isolated,102 the 
opponents argued that the subject matter in issue (the isolated gDNA) was no 
different from the raw materials on which it was based (gDNA in the human 
body).103 As such, it was not patent eligible. 
One of the things that underpinned the Myriad  litigation, particularly in 
relation to the isolated gDNA, was the question of how that material should be 
characterized. At each stage of the litigation, the fate of the isolated gDNA turned 
on whether it was construed chemically or genetically. This is because the outcome 
of this process directly influenced the isolated DNA’s relationship with the raw 
material (the native gDNA) and thus whether it was markedly different and patent 
eligible. The differing conclusions of the U.S. Supreme Court and the Australian 
Full Federal Court (and the difference between the Supreme Court and the Federal 
Circuit decisions) was directly linked to the way that the isolated gDNA was 
construed. 
In many instances, it would be normal to expect that the answer to the 
question of how subject matter is to be characterized would be resolved on the basis 
of a straightforward reading of the language in the patent claims. One of the reasons 
 
97. Brief for Petitioners at 5, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 
2107 (2013) (No. 12-398). 
98. “[N]o other molecule can store the information necessary to create and propagate human 
life the way human DNA does.” Brief for James D. Watson, Ph.D. as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Neither Party, supra note 27, at 5. 
99. Id. at 12. 
100. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2119 (2013). 
101. This was a prerequisite for the functioning of Myriad’s diagnostic use of the gene. Brief 
for Petitioners, supra note 97, at 5. 
102. Id. at 10. 
103. The Solicitor General argued that structural changes that left the natural substance’s 
operative properties entirely untouched were not sufficient in themselves to support patent eligibility. 
Otherwise, the removal of a kidney from the body might render the extracted kidney patent eligible. 
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party, supra note 24, at 22. 
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why there has been so much diversity of opinion about how the subject matter is to 
be interpreted, which has been a feature of much of the recent subject matter 
litigation, is that there was a sense of suspicion about the patent claims and whether 
they properly represented what was being protected,104 a concern which is often 
magnified with product claims. Here the concern was that patent attorneys should 
not be allowed to dress up patent ineligible subject matter in such a way as to a make 
it appear to be eligible.105 As the Supreme Court said in Mayo, patentees must not 
be allowed through drafting efforts to “monopolize the law of nature itself.”106 In 
this situation, the courts are forced to look beyond the traditional rules of claim 
interpretation to determine how the subject matter and the material on which it is 
based are to be construed and ultimately whether the two are markedly different. 
Over time, a number of different techniques and strategies have been used to 
provide guidance in these matters. 
One way of determining whether a modified natural product is “markedly 
different” from the underlying natural substance on which it is based, which was 
suggested by the Supreme Court in Mayo, is on the basis of “whether a patent on 
the modified product would have the practical effect of preempting the public’s 
ability to use the underlying substance.”107 While this was not presented as an 
exclusive test, there are still a number of problems with it, not least that it simply 
repeats the rationale in reverse: the test does nothing to answer the question of how 
difference is to be determined. It is also problematic in that the question of whether 
something preempts use of the underlying material depends on how the material is 
construed is the very problem that it is supposed to answer. Another problem in 
using preemption as a basis to determine whether something is markedly different 
arises because, despite suggestions to the contrary, preemption is always a matter of 
degree. Given that all nature-based inventions that are patented restrict access and 
use, at the very least in the specific and particular use that is disclosed in the patent, 
this gives rise to a further question, namely, what type and degree of preemption is 
permissible?108 The test outlined in Mayo does little to help answer this question. 
It has also been suggested that another factor that needs to be taken into 
account when considering whether subject matter is markedly different from the 
raw material on which it is based is the cause or source of that difference. If it is the 
 
104. This fear was reinforced by the view that Myriad’s claims were drafted so as to be difficult 
to invent around; that they did not claim “the specific chemical composition of a particular molecule” 
but instead the information “encoded in the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes.” Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2118. 
105. This has also given rise to the suggestion that some of the problems created by the Myriad 
decision for patentees might be avoided in the future through more careful (and different) claiming 
practices. Charles Lawson, Patenting DNA Sequences After the Myriad Decision: New Frontiers or Just More of 
the Same?, 33 BIOTECHNOLOGY L. REP. 3, 15 (2014). 
106. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1297 (2012). 
107. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party, supra note 24, at 
17. 
108. Following Mayo, the Solicitor General said that at a minimum a patent should not be 
allowed if the patent would have the effect of preempting all uses of the underlying natural substance. 
Id. at 17. 
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case that the difference is an inevitable or automatic consequence of dealing with 
the raw material it will not, so the argument goes, be patent eligible. Presumably the 
position would be the same in other situations where the inventive difference is not 
a product of the inventor’s efforts. In effect, this is the basis on which the Solicitor 
General argued that Myriad’s isolated DNA should be not be patent eligible.109 The 
Solicitor General accepted that the process of isolating “a particular DNA segment 
[did change] the molecule’s physical structure to a degree (since the ends of the 
segment must be ‘snipped’ in order to remove it from the cell of which it is a 
part).”110 That is, he accepted that there was a “difference” between the natural and 
the isolated DNA. Nonetheless he did not accept that there was a marked enough 
of a difference to render the isolated DNA patent worthy. The reason for this was 
that the changes were “simply inherent consequences of removing the original 
substance from its natural environment.”111 That is, the differences between isolated 
DNA and native DNA were “merely the inherent and necessary results of removing 
the DNA from its natural environment.”112 Given that the removal of the DNA 
from its natural environment is a prerequisite to studying and using it, to allow 
someone to patent something that was an inevitable consequence of that removal 
would have been tantamount to allowing a patent on the natural product itself.113 
Another factor that is sometimes relied upon as evidence that a particular 
subject matter is sufficiently different for it to be patent worthy is the fact that the 
modified product has a new use. In an argument that has parallels with the use of 
commercial success as an indicator of the obviousness of inventions, the utility of 
an invention is sometimes cited as one of the reasons for it being patent eligible.114 
Rather than attempting to characterize difference from the nature of the subject 
matter itself, here, marked difference is distilled from external considerations, 
namely from the value attributed to the modified substance that was not present in 
its unmodified form. Thus, one of the factors that underpinned the decision in 
Parke-Davis that the purified substance was patent eligible was that unlike the case 
when it was in its raw unpurified form, the purified substance was a useful 
pharmaceutical product.115 
 
109. Genomic DNA that has been isolated should not be patent eligible “because it has merely 
been ‘isolated’—i.e., extracted from its cellular environment . . . rather than significantly altered by 
human intervention.” Id. at 12. 
110. The Solicitor General also said it increased the utility since isolation allows researchers to 
study and exploit it in a laboratory. Id. at 10. 
111. Id. 
112. Id. at 20. Since isolation is “a prerequisite to meaningful productive use of native DNA,” 
treating changes that automatically occurred as a result of that isolation as sufficient to support patent 
eligibility would have “effectively preempt[ed] the public’s use of the underlying product of nature.” Id. 
at 10–11. “Because the removal process is a prerequisite to any exploitation of native DNA, 
respondents’ isolated DNA claims are the practical equivalent of patents on the underlying naturally 
occurring BRCA genes themselves.” Id. at 20. 
113. Id. at 18. 
114. An invention must be useful to be patent eligible. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
115. Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1911). 
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A similar approach was adopted in Chakrabarty, where the Supreme Court 
decided that an influential factor in determining whether the modified bacterium 
was patent eligible was that, unlike in the case with the unmodified bacterium, there 
was “potential for significant utility.”116 The question of whether utility is a useful 
guide to determine whether something is markedly different depends on the reason 
why the subject matter is excluded in the first place. If the exclusion exists because 
there is something inherently wrong with granting patent status to a certain type of 
subject matter, then it would not matter if a new use was found for that substance: 
it would remain unpatentable. In Europe, this is the approach taken in relation to 
human embryonic stem cells.117 If, however, the rationale for excluding subject 
matter is that granting protection would restrict the ability for third parties to use 
the underlying material, then there is more scope for using utility as a guide for 
categorizing subject matter. The problem here, however, is that there is no clear 
rationale given as to why products of nature are excluded. 
Yet another approach used to determine whether a biological innovation is 
markedly different from the natural material on which it is based (and thus patent 
eligible) focuses on changes that occur at the genomic level; that is, biological 
subject matter is construed genetically. Specifically, the focus is on whether, through 
the action of the inventor, there have been changes that are able to be passed on 
from one generation to the next.118 This can be seen, for example, in the comments 
by the Supreme Court in relation to the isolated DNA that Myriad did not “create 
or alter any of the genetic information encoded in the BRCA1 and BRCA2 
genes,”119 nor did they “create or alter the genetic structure of DNA.”120 As the 
Court said, Myriad’s claims are “concerned primarily with the information contained 
in the genetic sequence, not with the specific chemical composition of a particular 
molecule.”121 The decision to construe biological material genetically can also be 
seen in the Federal Circuit decision of In re Roslin Institute,122 which concerned the 
patentability of cloned animals (cattle, sheep, pigs, and goats).123 In the course of 
the proceedings, Roslin found themselves in the (ironic) situation where to establish 
 
116. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 310 (1980); see also Merck & Co. v. Olin Mathieson 
Chem. Corp. 253 F.2d 156, 164 (1958) (contrasting vitamin B12 found in nature, which was only 
available in minute quantities and, as such, had no utility, therapeutically or commercially, with the 
synthetic vitamin B12 was both useful and commercially valuable). 
117. European Patent Convention, supra note 11, art. 53(a), rule 28(b). 
118. As the District Court in Association for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office 
said, the “information encoded by DNA reflects its primary biological function: directing the synthesis 
of other molecules in the body.” Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 702 F. Supp. 2d. 181, 228 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (emphasis added). 
119. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116 (2013). 
120. Id. 
121. Id. at 2118. “Myriad’s claims are simply not expressed in terms of chemical composition, 
nor do they rely in any way on the chemical changes that result from the isolation of a particular section 
of DNA. Instead, the claims understandably focus on the genetic information encoded in the BRCA1 
and BRCA2 genes.” Id. 
122. In re Roslin Institute (Edinburgh), 750 F.3d 1333 (2014). 
123. Id. at 1334. 
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that they were subject matter eligible they had to argue that the cloned animals were 
markedly different to the donor animals used to create them. To this end, Roslin 
argued that the cloned animals were different to the donor animals as a result of the 
environment in which the respective animals lived.124 Specifically, Roslin argued 
that environmental factors lead to phenotypic differences that distinguished the 
clones from their donor mammals (that is, the animal’s external shape, size, or color 
that arose from the interaction of the organism’s genotype with its environment).125 
While this issue was not considered in any detail by the Federal Circuit, primarily 
because the phenotypic differences were not claimed,126 the court did say that they 
would have dismissed the argument anyway because the phenotypic differences 
were the work of nature (the environment), not the applicant.127 Roslin also argued 
that the clones were patent eligible because they were time-delayed versions of their 
donor mammals and therefore were different.128 This was rejected because the 
“difficulty with the time-delayed characteristic is that it is true of any copy of an 
original.”129 
Roslin further argued that the clones were distinguishable from the original 
donor mammals because of differences in their mitochondrial DNA.130 This was a 
consequence of the cloning process whereby the cloned animal’s mitochondrial 
DNA comes from the oocyte used to create it and not from the donor’s mammary 
cell.131 The problem for Roslin, however, was that the difference in the 
mitochondrial DNA between the donor and cloned animals was unclaimed. Instead, 
the clones were defined in terms of their nuclear DNA. Although the court was 
willing to accept that having the same nuclear DNA as the donor mammal may not 
necessarily result in patent ineligibility in every case, the problem here was that the 
claims did not describe clones with markedly different characteristics from the 
donor animals of which they were copies.132 On the basis that the cloned animal 
was “an exact genetic replica of the adult mammal from which the somatic cell 
nucleus was taken,”133 the Federal Circuit “concluded that the claimed subject 
matter was ineligible for patent protection under § 101 because it constituted a 
natural phenomenon that did not possess ‘markedly different characteristics than 
any found in nature.’”134 In this sense, what the court found was that cloned animals 
were “natural” (or at least not different from a natural animal) and thus not 
patentable subject matter. 
 




128. Id. at 1339. 
129. Id. 
130. Id. at 1338. 
131. Id. 
132. Id. at 1339. 
133. Id. at 1334. 
134. Id. at 1335. 
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In assessing difference, the court in Roslin focused on whether the clones were 
genetically distinct to the raw materials that they were derived from.135 That is, the 
biological subject matter was viewed through a genetic lens. This is reflected in the 
comments by the Federal Circuit when comparing the cloned animals with the 
isolated naturally occurring DNA strands in Myriad that were held not to be patent 
eligible.136 As the Federal Circuit said: 
Here, as in Myriad, Roslin “did not create or alter any of the genetic 
information” of its claimed clones, “[n]or did [Roslin] create or alter the 
genetic structure of [the] DNA” used to make its clones. Instead, Roslin’s 
chief innovation was the preservation of the donor DNA such that the 
clone is an exact copy of the mammal from which the somatic cell was 
taken. Such a copy is not eligible for patent protection.137 
In this sense the Federal Circuit stressed that the subject matter needed to be looked 
at genetically. This was also reflected in the court’s critique of the fact that Roslin’s 
patent application did not identify how differences in mitochondrial DNA 
influenced or could influence the characteristics of the cloned animals.138 That is, 
they did not establish that there was a genetic difference. 
It is interesting to note that a similar approach to interpreting biological subject 
matter was recently adopted by the Enlarged Board of Appeal at the European 
Patent Office in the State of Israel/Tomatoes139 and Plant Bioscience/Broccoli140 decisions. 
This occurred when, as part of the litigation, the Enlarged Board was called upon 
to consider the scope of one of the categories of subject matter expressly excluded 
from patent protection in European patent law, namely, “essentially biological 
processes for the production of plants or animals . . . .”141 In considering what is 
 
135. The fact that the clones were genetic copies of their donor parents rendered the clones 
unpatentable. Id. at 1337. 
136. Id. 
137. Id. (citation omitted). 
138. Id. at 1338. 
139. Tomatoes/State of Israel, Decision of the European Patent Office, Enlarged Board of 
Appeal, Case G1/08 (Dec. 9, 2010), O.J. E.P.O. 206 (2012); see also Tomatoes II/State of Israel, 
Decision of the European Patent Office, Technical Board of Appeal, Case T1242/06 (May 31, 2012), 
O.J. E.P.O. 42 (2013); Decision of the European Patent Office, Enlarged Board of Appeal, Case G2/
12 (March 25, 2015). 
140. Broccoli/Plant Bioscience, Decision of the European Patent Office, Enlarged Board of 
Appeal, Case G2/07 (Dec. 9, 2010), O.J. E.P.O. 130 (2012); see also Broccoli/Plant Bioscience, Decision 
of the European Patent Office, Technical Board of Appeal, Case T83/05 ( July 8, 2013), O.J. E.P.O. 
A39 (2014); Decision of the European Patent Office, Enlarged Board of Appeal, Case G2/13 (March 
25, 2015). 
141. EPC 2000, article 53(b) provides that European patents shall not be granted in respect of 
“plant or animal varieties or essentially biological processes for the production of plants or animals; this 
provision shall not apply to microbiological processes or the products thereof . . . .” European Patent 
Convention, supra note 11, at art. 53(b). On this, see BENTLY & SHERMAN, supra note 6, at 507–13. See 
also Law No. 9.279, art. 18, May 14, 1996 (Braz.), which provides for the possibility of patenting 
genetically modified microorganisms, which through direct human intervention, possess a trait 
normally not achievable by the species under natural conditions, except for all plants or animals or parts 
thereof, and which are not a mere discovery. 
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meant by “essentially biological,” the Enlarged Board looked at the legislative 
history of the exclusion, which showed that the legislator’s intention was to exclude 
from patentability the kind of plant breeding processes conventionally used at that 
time (namely, crossing and selection).142 Although classical breeding methods 
frequently use technical devices such as pruning shears, grafting tools, and 
greenhouses, the Enlarged Board said, “while such technical devices may perfectly 
well be patented themselves the biological process in which they are used may 
not.”143 The Board also said that the mere fact that a breeding process includes a 
technical process did not necessarily mean that the process was not essentially 
biological. The willingness to accept that a process could still be essentially 
biological when it included technical steps gave rise to the question: How do we 
distinguish a process that includes a technical step that is still an essentially biological 
process from a process that includes a technical step that takes the process outside 
the scope of the exclusion? 
In essence, the way that this question was answered was to focus on whether 
the process in question genetically changed the plant or animal. Like the Supreme 
Court in Myriad and the Federal Circuit in Roslin, the Enlarged Board looked at the 
subject matter in terms of its genetic identity. As the Board said: if a technical step 
modifies or introduces a trait into the genome of a plant or animal, the process will 
not be essentially biological. This would be the case, for example, where genetic 
engineering techniques are used to insert or modify one or more genes into a plant 
or animal. In contrast, where the modification to the genome of the plant or animal 
was a product of natural processes—that is, where the technical steps merely serve 
to enable or assist the performance of that process—the process as a whole will be 
essentially biological. This is also the case where the technical step includes the use 
of special greenhouses to grow plants, the use of specific tools to help with grafting 
or pollination, or the use of molecular markers to facilitate selection for the desired 
properties. While technical means are used in these situations to assist with the 
breeding process, they are nonetheless “characterised by the fact that the traits of 
the plants resulting from the crossing were determined by the underlying natural 
phenomenon of meiosis.”144 That is, the traits of the plants (or animals) are 
primarily the result of natural forces. 
As the European Patent Office Guidelines explain, a method of crossing, 
inter-breeding, or selectively breeding “say, horses involving merely selecting for 
breeding and bringing together those animals (or their gametes) having certain 
characteristics would be essentially biological and therefore unpatentable.”145 The 
situation would remain unchanged even if the process contained an additional 
 
142. Tomatoes/State of Israel, O.J. E.P.O. 206. 
143. Id. at 64. 
144. Id. at 66 (emphasis added). 
145. EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, GUIDELINES FOR EXAMINATION § 5.4.2 ESSENTIALLY 
BIOLOGICAL PROCESSES FOR THE PRODUCTION OF PLANTS OR ANIMALS, http://www.epo.org/law-
practice/legal-texts/html/guidelines/e/g_ii_5_4_2.htm [http://perma.cc/KP4N-JJ55] (last updated 
Jan. 10, 2015). 
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feature of a technical nature such as the use of genetic molecular markers to select 
either parent or progeny. In all these instances, the resulting plant or animal is 
essentially the result of natural forces. The situation would change, however, in the 
case of a process where a gene or trait was inserted into a plant by genetic 
engineering that would be potentially patentable. In positive terms, this means that 
to fall outside the process exclusion, there has to be “an additional step of a technical 
nature which by itself introduced or modified a trait in the genome.”146 
One of the points of contention in Myriad was whether the isolated DNA 
should be seen in chemical or genetic terms. While a decision to evaluate change to 
biological subject matter at the genomic level would overcome this problem (but 
certainly not appease Myriad and their supporters), it gives rise to a number of 
additional concerns. In particular, if the innovation really is a chemical one, why 
shouldn’t a patentee be able to describe their invention in chemical terms? In part, 
the problems arise here because while an applicant may highlight one aspect or 
dimension of the subject matter in order to present it in such a way that it is patent 
eligible (here, its chemical traits), once protected as a product patent, the patentee 
are able to claim other uses (here, genetic). Another thing to keep in mind here is 
that a decision to look at biological matter in terms of inheritable change does not 
necessarily mean that questions of how to interpret the genetic identity of that 
biological object will not arise. For example, while the Court in Roslin suggested that 
had the claims been drafted differently, the existence of mitochondrial DNA might 
have been sufficient to establish a difference, it is not clear how the presence of 
“foreign” mitochondrial DNA in a cloned animal would be construed. As Friese 
has shown in a study of the way that different scientists view cloned animals, 
scientists do not agree what the existence of different mitochondrial DNA in a 
cloned animal means for the way cloned animals are classified—that is, whether the 
cloned animals are seen to be different to, or the same as, the donor animals they 
are derived from.147 The use of heredity as a means to categorize biological subject 
matter would also run into problems where something that has the potential for life 
is modified to prevent it from developing. What would be the case, for example, in 
relation to human parthenotes (which are asexually reproduced cells) that cannot 
develop to term because of the absence of parental DNA,148 or where a plant 
incorporates some form of genetic use restriction technology that prevents it from 
reproducing? 
We can also see some of the problems that arise in construing biological 
subject matter genetically if we look at the way the synthetic cDNA (which was held 
 
146. Tomatoes II/State of Israel, Decision of the European Patent Office, Technical Board of 
Appeal, Case T1242/06 (May 31, 2012), O.J. E.P.O. 42 (2013) (emphasis added). 
147. CARRIE FRIESE, CLONING WILD LIFE: ZOOS, CAPTIVITY, AND THE FUTURE OF 
ENDANGERED ANIMALS 32–40 (2013). 
148. See Int’l Stem Cell Corp. v. Comptroller Gen. of Patents, [2013] EWHC (Ch) 807, [21], 
[23], [36] (Eng.) (concerning “[p]arthenogenetic activation of oocytes for the production of human 
embryonic stem cells” and “non-fertilised human ovum whose division and further development have 
been stimulated by parthenogenesis”). 
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to be patent eligible149) was dealt with in Myriad. In arguing that the cDNA should 
not be patentable, the petitioners highlighted the fact that the cDNA contained the 
same protein-coding information (exon sequences) as DNA in the body.150 That is, 
the petitioners effectively argued that when viewed genetically, there was no 
difference between gDNA and cDNA. It is interesting that neither the Solicitor 
General nor the U.S. Supreme Court was able to provide a convincing response to 
this argument. For example, in responding to this argument the Solicitor General 
noted that “the properties of any product originally derived from nature . . . can be 
traced to the operation of natural principles”151 (which doesn’t really address the 
issue). The Solicitor General downplayed the similarity and argued that the 
properties of the cDNA molecules exons operated within a molecule that does not 
exist in nature. Shifting focus again, they added that the “fact that a cDNA 
incorporates nucleotide sequences whose significance is derived from nature . . . 
does not mean that the molecule as a whole is a product of nature.”152 The response 
by the Supreme Court was even more elusive. While the Supreme Court accepted 
the Petitioner’s argument that the “nucleotide sequence of cDNA is dictated by 
nature, not by the lab technician,” nonetheless the Court went on to say “[t]hat may 
be so, but the lab technician unquestionably creates something new when cDNA is 
made.”153 That is, while the cDNA may have been genetically the same as the raw 
gDNA, this was trumped by the fact that the lab technician had created something 
new. 
While evaluating change to biological material at the genomic level provides 
some clarity, it does not provide a litmus-like test that enables us to readily 
determine whether biological subject matter is markedly different to the natural 
material that it is derived from. In many ways, the problems here are symptomatic 
of broader issues that are applicable to all of the techniques used to categorize 
subject matter. Having reviewed some of the methods used to categorize subject 
matter in patent law, we are now in a position to return to the question posed at the 
outset of the Article: Why is it that patent law has experienced so many problems 
in attempting to categorize subject matter? 
II. LEGAL TAXONOMY 
One of the reasons why botanical, zoological, and microbiological taxonomy 
have been so successful in what they do—which is to categorize subject matter, to 
provide certainty to third parties about this process, and thus to allow named objects 
to circulate—is that while the taxonomic exercise is one that involves judgement, it 
is a process in which the number of points at which judgment needs to be exercised 
 
149. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2111 (2013). 
150. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party, supra note 24, at 
20–26. 
151. Id. at 19. 
152. Id. 
153. Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2119. 
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have been minimized. It is also a process that forces those passing judgment to 
explain why they have reached a particular decision. While these factors have played 
an important role in ensuring the success of the modern taxonomic exercise, 
perhaps the most important reason for their success is that through a combination 
of factors, most notably the adoption of the type specimen (which has the 
“paradoxical status as a concrete abstraction”154), scientific taxonomists created a 
new way of representing the many by the one. Through what has been described as 
an act of applied metaphysics, taxonomists created an artificial objectivity that 
allows them to classify and categorize things with a high degree of certainty and 
predictability. 
Although patent law has made good use of these developments, scientific 
taxonomy is of little or no assistance in helping patent law to decide how subject 
matter is to be classified. At best, all scientific taxonomy has to offer patent law 
here are general insights into some of the problems that occur when classifying 
things and how those problems might be overcome. While science may play an 
important role in informing this process, ultimately the decision about how subject 
matter is to be classified is a legal question.155 In this situation, patent law has to 
rely on its own resources to decide how subject matter is to be classified. The chorus 
of complaints that have accompanied recent decisions in the United States and 
Australia suggests that patent law has not been very successful in this task. 
One of the criticisms made of the recent subject matter decisions is that it is 
not possible to identify a consistent or clear approach to the way that subject matter 
is classified: different tests are used at different times, often interchangeably and 
without explanation. There is not only diversity between different judgements; there 
is sometimes even diversity within a single judgement. Thus while most of the 
discussion about the isolated DNA in Myriad focused on whether—and, if so, 
how—the isolated DNA differed from its natural counterpart, the discussion about 
cDNA tended to focus on the labor that went into the creation of the synthesized 
materials.156 
The fact that when classifying subject matter the courts shift almost seamlessly 
between different tests, even within the same judgment, creates problems for 
treatise writers, academics, and lawyers. Nonetheless, the fluid, shifting, and 
interchangeable way in which the tests are employed is not necessarily indicative of 
some sort of fundamental problem with the law itself. Indeed, the situation would 
probably be even worse if the courts did not adapt the test to the particular problem 
at hand. While this does make the task of describing and explaining the law more 
 
154. Lorraine Daston, Type Specimens and Scientific Memory, 31 CRITICAL INQUIRY 153, 158 
(2004). 
155. See Burk, supra note 56, at 95. 
156. Thus, the Solicitor General argued that artificial DNA molecules such as cDNA were 
patent eligible inventions because “[c]reating cDNA requires significant manipulation and alteration of 
naturally occurring genetic materials,” and that “[i]ssuing patents on cDNA creates no risk of 
preempting other uses of the raw materials from which cDNA is created.” Brief for the United States 
as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party, supra note 24, at 10. 
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problematic, this fluidity should not be seen as an inherent weakness. Rather, it is 
an inevitable consequence of the nature of the subject-matter inquiry, of the 
diversity of the subject matter under scrutiny, and the different ways in which that 
subject matter is presented to the law for examination. It is also a consequence of 
courts selecting the most appropriate test for the facts at hand. This is because, as 
we noted above, the different tests used to classify subject matter correspond to 
different aspects of the (fictitious) model of invention. In reflection of this, the 
courts select the test that is most suitable to the subject matter in question. This can 
explain why the U.S. Supreme Court asked different questions when deciding the 
fate of the isolated gDNA (marked difference) and the synthetic cDNA (creative 
labor). One of the consequences of this is there is not, nor can there be, a single 
universal test that can be used to determine how subject matter is to be categorized: 
the test needs to change depending on the situation. The complexity that this creates 
is compounded by the fact that as the different tests effectively look at the same 
thing from different perspectives, they are often used conjointly. These problems 
are made worse by the fact that the questions asked will often differ depending on 
the facts that are presented for adjudication and how the cases are argued. 
Given that the tests commonly used to classify subject matter are based on a 
shared image of the process of creation, differing only in terms of the perspective 
they take on that process, it might be reasonable to expect that there is not only a 
synergy between the different tests but also that the tests can be used 
interchangeably without impacting on the outcomes of the classification process. It 
seems, however, that this may not necessarily always be the case. We can see this, 
for example, in the Roslin decision where, as we noted above, the court held that the 
cloned animals were not patentable because as genetic replicas of the donor animals 
they were not “markedly different” from the raw material that they were derived 
from.157 One of the notable things about this decision was that it was made despite 
the fact that the cloned animals were clearly the product of human ingenuity. It was 
also made despite the fact that human ingenuity had clearly altered the donor animal. 
The celebration and horror that accompanied the creation of Dolly (the cloned 
sheep) is a testament to this. Rather, it was held that according to the criteria used 
to judge difference, namely genetic identity, that the cloned animals were identical 
to their donor animals.158 
While in most situations an examination that focused on the labor that goes 
into the development of a new invention would be coextensive with an examination 
that looked at the difference between a would-be invention and the things on which 
it is based, that was not the case here. Rather, the inquiry into whether the invention 
was markedly different from nature not only trumped an inquiry that focused on 
the labor and effort of the inventor, it also led to what would have probably been a 
 
157. In re Roslin Institute (Edinburgh), 750 F.3d 1333, 1336 (2014) (citing Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 310 (1980)). 
158. Id. at 1339. 
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different result.159 While this may not occur in many situations, the mere fact that it 
is a possibility compounds the uncertainty that surrounds the subject-matter inquiry. 
It also leads us to question the relative applicability of the different tests. Is it really 
the case, for example, that the tests can be used interchangeably without changing 
the outcome? Are they equally applicable to different types of inventions—to 
different factual scenarios? These questions are particularly relevant in relation to 
biological inventions (or at least to certain types of biological inventions). This is 
because while the fictitious model of invention that underpins the different tests 
used to categorize subject matter fits with mechanical inventions as the archetypical 
originating inventions, this is not the case with (some) biological inventions. The 
reason for this relates to the inventive process and the role that the human agent 
plays in that process. More specifically, it arises because a key feature of biological 
(inductive or empirical) inventions is that the role of the originating material and 
human agent are reversed.160 Although with originating inventions the human 
inventor uses their special skills to modify the underlying materials and to reduce 
the abstract to the specific in order to produce a new invention, this is not the case 
with biological inventions. Here, it is nature that does the creating while the role of 
the human agent is relegated to identifying and documenting that innovation (which 
is a highly skilled art). 
While in some cases humans may intentionally or accidently stimulate a change 
in nature, they usually cannot pretend that the invention was the result of an 
originating design that shaped the final creation (other than to say, “we were looking 
for a better plant”). This manifests itself in the fact that the “inventor” is unable to 
reduce the invention to a written form that third parties can use to re-create the 
invention. The inability to reduce biological inventions to a recipe that allows them 
to be replicated by others posed a serious problem to the potential patentability of 
biological inventions in the early part of the twentieth century: a problem that was 
resolved when the law accepted deposit of a physical manifestation of the invention 
or the biological starting material for the invention as a way of satisfying the 
requirement of enabling disclosure.161 The fact that the process of invention 
changes depending on the subject matter in question also calls into question the 
applicability of the different tests used to determine subject matter eligibility. While 
it is possible to compare biological subject matter with the material on which it is 
based and to ask whether the latter is markedly different from the former, it is much 
more difficult to use either the labor of the inventor or the existence of an inventive 
concept as a way of categorizing certain types of biological subject matter. In these 
cases, at best there is an awkward fit; at worst, the tests are simply inapplicable. 
 
159. It is possible that had the ingenuity approach been followed the court could have 
concluded that the subject matter was patent ineligible because it was created by the wrong type of 
labor. 
160. For a discussion, see POTTAGE & SHERMAN, supra note 39, at 186–89. 
161. Deposit of Biological Materials for Patent Purposes, 54 Fed. Reg. 34864 (Aug. 29, 1989) 
(to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1). 
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While some of the uncertainty associated with the subject-matter inquiry is 
attributable to the fact that courts apply different tests depending on the facts at 
hand, this is only part of the story. In order to understand the reason for the 
confusion, we need to look more closely at the way subject matter is classified. As 
was explained above, in order for courts to determine how subject matter is 
categorized, they need to make a number of preliminary decisions. How is the 
subject matter to be characterized? How is nature to be construed? How much and 
what type of labor is needed to transform nature into invention? And so on. It is 
clear that the fate of subject matter often depends on how these preliminary issues 
are resolved. It was clear, for example, that the fate of the isolated DNA in the 
Myriad litigation depended on how it was construed.162 So too in Mayo, where the 
fate of the subject matter in issue depended on the way abstraction was defined. In 
nearly all situations, the answer to the question of how subject matter is to be 
classified has already been decided before the courts asks, for example, “is the 
subject matter markedly different from the raw materials on which it is based?” 
One of the problems here is that there is typically little or no explanation given 
as to why the subject matter was characterized in a particular way. Instead, we tend 
to get bald statements that effectively determine how the subject matter is to be 
classified. Thus, in the Australian Full Federal Court decision there was no 
explanation offered as to why the isolated gDNA was exclusively viewed as a 
chemical (which almost inevitably led to the conclusion that the isolated DNA was 
patent eligible): it was simply presented as a given.163 As a result, we have little 
guidance as to why particular decisions were reached.164 In situations where there 
are valid competing interpretations, we need to know why one interpretation was 
chosen over another. Why aren’t genes chemicals? The fact that the reasons for the 
decisions are often, at best, opaque, does little to help us understand how subject 
matter is categorized.165 
Another important reason for the uncertainty that surrounds the subject-
matter inquiry is that there is no real clarity about many of the underlying concepts. 
If we take the case of something as fundamental as “nature,” for example, we can 
see that one of the reasons why the product-of-nature doctrine has been so elusive 
is because there is no clear sense of what is meant by “nature” in patent law. Robert 
Cook captured the essence of this problem when, in speaking about patent 
 
162. The different conclusions reached by the Supreme Court and the Australian Full Federal 
Court in relation to the isolated gDNA can be explained by the way that the subject matter was 
construed (either chemically or genetically). 
163. D’Arcy v Myriad Genetics Inc [2014] FCAFC 115 (Austl.). 
164. It is not clear how we are to undertake the important task of characterizing subject matter 
and the material on which it is based. These problems are magnified in situations where a court becomes 
suspicious about the language of a patent because it believes that a patentee is attempting to dress up 
nonpatentable subject matter as if it was patentable. 
165. Given that the process of determining how subject matter is to be classified is often a 
matter of degree, we also need to have some idea about where and how the limits are to be set. What 
does it mean, for example, for something to be markedly different? 
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protection for plants, he said, “[u]nquestionably the genetic elements which go to 
make up a new form of plant are ‘natural.’ Into which category of ‘naturalness’ the 
courts will conclude that these phenomena of plants should be placed in [sic] an 
extremely interesting problem.”166 Given that “nature” is the very thing that the 
product-of-nature exclusion sets out to protect, it would be reasonable to presume 
that there would be some sense of understanding about what nature was. This, 
however, is not the case. Instead we are presented with a situation where there are 
not only a number of different “natures” at work in patent law,167 the term is also 
used with little clarity and consistency. 
While patent law has been willing to accept that biological inventions 
necessarily embody and build on natural elements, there has been less consideration 
given to the converse issue, namely whether and to what extent “nature” involves 
human intervention.168 In some situations, nature is presented almost like a timeless 
ahistorical concept that is prelaw. This is the nature that the product-of-nature 
doctrine sets out to protect. While this nature includes human genes, the work of 
humans in changing nature is usually excluded from that definition. The problem 
with this, however, is that patent law rarely (if ever) has to deal with a nature 
untouched by human hands. It may work hard to protect and preserve a natural 
domain, but this nature is different from the nature that is presented to the law for 
evaluation and judgment. Thus, the bacteria in Funk Brothers (which were excluded 
as nonpatentable products of nature169) were subject to an array of tests and 
interventions as they were transplanted from their natural environment to the 
laboratory.170 Although patent doctrine often proceeds on the basis that it was 
dealing with nature in the Garden of Eden, there is usually some degree of human 
involvement with even the purest of natures that are presented to the law for 
scrutiny. The problems that this creates are compounded by the fact that like 
varieties and species, “genes” do not really exist in nature. Instead, they are a human 
construct; they are a product of our penchant and need to classify things, to name 
and order (a topic which is at the heart of patentable subject matter).171 This does 
not directly impact the subject-matter inquiry in the United States and Australia (in 
 
166. Cook, supra note 37, at 318. “It is a little hard to distinguish the natural property of tungsten 
that renders it ductile under certain conditions from the natural properties of carbon and hydrogen and 
oxygen that permit them to combine in various ways to form a vast array of patentable chemical 
compounds.” Id. For an example of this, see the discussions about the changes needed to a crayfish for 
it to qualify as a manufacture in Ex parte Grayson, 51 U.S.P.Q. 413 (Bd. App. 1941), where it found that 
a shrimp with the head and digestive tract removed was not a manufacture. 
167. In patent law’s version of the raw and the cooked, these include raw or pure nature, isolated 
raw nature, and modified nature. 
168. While the issue has not been addressed in the United States and Australia, it has been 
discussed in Europe in the context of the exclusion of essential biological processes. See European 
Patent Convention, supra note 11, art. 53(a), rule 28(b). 
169. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 132 (1948). 
170. See id. at 129–37. 
171. See STAFFAN MÜLLER-WILLE & HANS-JÖRG RHEINBERGER, A CULTURAL HISTORY OF 
HEREDITY 5 (2012); Burk, supra note 56, at 95. This leads Burk to argue, “science informs—but cannot 
answer—the legal question as to whether a gene is a product of nature.” Burk, supra note 56, at 95. 
Sherman_production read v2 (clean) (Do Not Delete) 3/3/2016  7:10 PM 
2015] WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO INVENT NATURE? 1227 
the way that it does in Europe), but it does remind us that the concept of the gene, 
like nature more generally, is not something that is fixed and prehuman. This should 
also serve to remind us that the law’s perception of what counts as “nature” has 
changed over time, and that nature has a history. It also serves to remind us that the 
Myriad litigation was not only concerned with the patentability of genes, but also 
with what we mean by “nature,” and whether—and, if so, how—that concept has 
been changed by recent advances in biotechnology. While it may take some time 
before we are in a position to determine the impact that decisions like Myriad have 
on the way nature is construed in patent law, it only serves to introduce yet another 
variable into the subject-matter inquiry. 
CONCLUSION 
Over the last few centuries, patent law has undergone many changes that have 
allowed it to respond to new technologies and policy demands, shifts in geo-political 
considerations, and changes to where and how research and innovation are 
organized and funded. Unfortunately, however, this has not been the case in relation 
to the subject-matter inquiry in the United States and Australia, which largely remain 
locked in a premodern framework. The confusion that surrounds the recent subject 
matter decisions is testament to this. Although there have been some developments, 
it is as if patent law is effectively operating in the equivalent of a pre-Linnaean world. 
In contrast to scientific taxonomy, which has been successful in minimizing the 
number of places where decisions are made that affect how things are categorized, 
the fate of subject matter in patent law is potentially decided in a range of different 
places. The uncertainty that this generates is compounded by the fact that the 
boundaries of the excluded categories are either unclear or changing, or both. These 
problems are exacerbated by the uncertainty that accompanies the concepts 
underpinning the tests used to decide how things are to be classified. In many ways 
these problems are symptomatic of a broader problem with the subject-matter 
inquiry—namely, there is no clear guidance about the criteria to be used to 
categorize subject matter. In part this is a consequence of what patent law expects 
of the subject-matter inquiry. Courts in the United States and Australia not only 
have to establish the parameters of the categories, the demand for some type of 
qualitative taxonomy also means that the courts are also required to pass judgement 
over the things being categorized.172 One of the reasons why the subject-matter 
inquiry is so uncertain and problematic is that patent law has yet to develop a 
consistent and reliable means to navigate these issues. 
The problems that this confusion creates are very real. They not only 
complicate the task of treatise writers, commentators, and lawyers attempting to 
 
172. As with the decision to define essential derivation in plant breeders rights law in terms of 
“importance,” so too the decision to require that patent eligible biological inventions are markedly 
different from the natural form on which they are based, or they build upon inventive concepts requires 
the courts to pass judgement. On this, see Jay Sanderson, Essential Derivation, Law and the Limits of Science, 
in PATENT LAW AND BIOLOGICAL INVENTIONS 34, 46–50 (Matthew Rimmer ed., 2006). 
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make sense of the law, they also potentially undermine the patent system itself, given 
that the value of patents depends on the extent to which they can be trusted. For 
critics of gene patenting, it is possible that the uncertainty generated by the lack of 
guidance about subject matter eligibility may be as effective a result in the long run 
as the Supreme Court decision in Myriad itself. In the meantime, the pressing 
question in this context is whether there is anything that can be done to rectify these 
problems. One potential solution is for the legislature to intervene, whether through 
the introduction of specific subject matter exclusions or by regulating how the rights 
are exploited.173 Given the current political climate in the United States and 
Australia, it seems unlikely that any of these options will be taken up, at least in the 
near future. It is also possible, as has happened previously in patent law (notably in 
relation to patent claims174 and the deposit system175), that the solution to the 
problems confronting patent law will be provided by patent lawyers. One factor that 
militates against this is that where professional solutions have been adopted in the 
past, they have been developed in a consensual environment where there is 
widespread agreement. This is not the case in relation to the subject-matter inquiry, 
where there is a divergence of opinion. While this does not preclude a profession-
driven solution, it does make it less likely. 
It is also possible that the judiciary might intervene to resolve the problems 
confronting patent law in dealing with patentable subject matter. One possibility 
would be for the courts to follow the lead offered by American plant patent law 
over the course of the twentieth century. Faced with questions about how the 
relationship between breeder (qua inventor) and the resulting plant law was to be 
configured, plant patent law jettisoned the old settlement divide that underpinned 
traditional patent jurisprudence and redefined the notion of the nature and 
invention.176 Another option would be for the courts to follow the lead of the 
European Patent Office, which has radically changed the way it approaches subject 
matter eligibility over the last decade. Frustrated by the uncertainty and confusion 
that accompanied the various efforts to navigate patentable subject matter, primarily 
in relation to computer related inventions, the European Patent Office effectively 
jettisoned the subject-matter inquiry (or at least reduced it to very broad 
brushstrokes: is the subject matter technological?), when it adopted the so-called 
any-hardware approach to patentable subject matter, whereby the existence of any 
type of technology is sufficient for something to be deemed patent eligible.177 Under 
 
173. Rai described patent validity doctrines as “a very blunt mechanism” for promoting access 
and autonomy. Arti K. Rai, Biomedical Patents at the Supreme Court: A Path Forward, 66 STAN. L. REV. 
ONLINE 111, 111–12 (2013). 
174. See David J. Brennan, The Evolution of English Patent Claims as Property Definers, 4 INTELL. 
PROP. Q., 361, 398 (2005). 
175. See POTTAGE & SHERMAN, supra note 39, at 186–91. 
176. See Alain Pottage & Brad Sherman, Organisms and Manufactures: On the History of Plant 
Inventions, 31 MELB. U. L. REV. 539, (2007). 
177. It is important to contrast situations where the existence (or otherwise) of an inventive 
concept is used to categorize subject matter (as in Alice), with the attempt to shift the inquiry away from 
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the new approach, the mere presence of a technological artifact or process, no 
matter how old or lacking in originality (such as a cup, a nail, or a personal 
computer), is sufficient for something to pass the subject matter threshold. 
Although the adoption of the any-hardware approach at the European Patent 
Office may have made it much easier for applicants to satisfy the subject matter 
threshold, this has not meant that there has been an overall lowering of standards 
and a corresponding increase in the number of patents. Instead, what has happened 
is that debates about validity have shifted from subject matter to inventive step.178 
As well as confronting the fact that the shift to inventive step has been rejected in 
the United States, one of the problems with the suggestion that we can shift the 
focus of attention from subject matter to inventive step is that it presumes that there 
is a type of symmetry between these different areas of law. While this may be the 
case when we are dealing with computer-based inventions, where it is generally 
accepted that computer hardware is a form of technology, in many cases this is the 
very thing that is being disputed in relation to biological inventions. One of the 
consequences of this is that it calls into question the possibility of transferring the 
focus of attention from subject matter to inventive step, at least in relation to 
biological inventions. It also serves to remind us that despite the flurry of judicial 
activity in recent years, patent law in the United States and Australia is still not in a 
position whereby it can sensibly answer the question, “what does it mean to invent 
nature?” nor is it any closer to developing an effective way of categorizing 
patentable subject matter than it was before. 
  
 
one about subject matter to a more case-specific and fact based inquiry into the obviousness or 
inventiveness of the disputed claims. On the latter, see BENTLY & SHERMAN, supra note 6, at 465–71. 
178. For a discussion, see BENTLY & SHERMAN, supra note 6, at 455–71. 
Sherman_production read v2 (clean) (Do Not Delete) 3/3/2016  7:10 PM 
1230 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5:1193 
 
